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(C) OBJECTS AND PURPOSES IN DTCS 
An indication of the object and purpose may be the title 
of the convention. The German UK Double Tax Convention 
is entitled: “Convention of 26 November 1964 between 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion.’
Clearly, the conception in both countries of the very same 
contractual arrangement amounting to the “atypical silent 
partnership” has the potential of leading to double taxation. 
Therefore a reconciliation of the understanding in both 
jurisdictions is desirable in order to achieve the first of the two 
purposes. The drafters of the convention seem to have relied on 
the fact that the convention will usually be applied by only one 
contracting state which then applies its own law under Article 
II (3) DTC. If a conflict arises it can be resolved according to 
the rules in Articles XVIII and XVIIIA, elimination of double 
taxation (including crediting tax paid) and mutual agreement 
procedure which can also be invoked by the taxpayer.
Therefore, the so-called conflicts of qualification may 
actually be a conscious choice of the contracting parties.
The question is why an enumeration of cases triggering 
business profits or dividends is then necessary at all. Articles 
II to XVI clearly seek to establish the distribution of income 
between the two contracting states mainly according to the 
place of residence of the taxpayer and according to the location 
of the source it is derived from as exceptions (PEs, immovable 
property etc). Article XVIII on the other hand, seems to adhere 
to a “first-come-first-served” principle. Finally, the taxpayer 
can, according to Article XVIIIA, seek an “appropriate” 
application of the DTC without being expressly limited to 
avoiding double taxation or fiscal evasion if “the actions of 
one or both of the Contracting Parties result or will result for 
him in taxation not in accordance with this Convention” (Art 
XVIIIA (1)). This means that the correct application of the 
treaty itself is a value in that provision.
There are a number of express, likely and unspoken 
objectives and purposes of the convention, and these might even 
be in conflict with each other. The content of the convention 
may not reflect the objectives and purposes accurately, or the 
objectives and purposes may not have been achieved by the 
content of the convention. 
A misalignment between the declared or underlying 
object and purpose and the actual content of a convention 
or other uniform instrument will impact on the quality 
of the interpretation and hence its application. The more 
politicised a convention is, the higher the possibility for such 
misalignments. In the case of double taxation conventions the 
motivations and driving forces behind the conclusion of those 
are distinctly fraught: a natural conflict occurs when states 
decide to compromise by making concessions on their right 
to tax (ie on fiscal sovereignty which is considered one of the 
most important elements of state sovereignty), supposedly for 
the benefit of migrating taxpayers and partner states. Some 
objectives may not be openly admitted, and some may be only 
reluctantly followed, leading to half-hearted drafts and subtle 
hints. Experience in international negotiations and observing 
the slow process even within the EU makes it very clear how 
jealously states guard their positions in this area.
(D) ARTICLE 31(3)  LIT.B VCLT – SUBSEQUENT 
PRACTICE 
Can the German treatment of the silent partner be based on 
a subsequent practice according to Article 31 (3) lit.b VCLT?
A 1992 decision of the German supreme tax court suggests 
that this is not the case. It concerned dividends paid to US 
tax payer which the German authorities sought to treat as 
business profits and tax in Germany. The court held that this 
practice was against the DTC US-D and the fact that the US 
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authorities had not intervened (because they most likely did 
not know about this just as the UK authorities in Memec ) did 
not establish a subsequent practice under Article  31(3) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT – this 
rule was not expressly mentioned). Here, for the first time, the 
element of mutuality is resonating. The subsequent practice 
cannot be unilateral.
This clearly shows the conflict between Article II(3) DTC 
D-UK, Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
respectively, and the VCLT Art II(3) seems to suggest that the 
unilateral element is justified. It seems to work as a conflict 
rule, referring any matter where the convention is unilaterally 
applied to domestic law. But as set out above, Article II(3) is 
really not a method article, as it is called in most commentaries. 
It is an interpretation rule. The convention does not contain a 
method article. To conceive Article  II(3) as providing a method, 
providing a step away from the convention and into domestic 
law, means depriving the convention of its international 
character. It defeats the purpose of creating an international 
agreement about international (ie cross border) situations. It 
steps out of the scenario of distributing tax income between 
two states and refers everything back into the “applying” state, 
conferring a prerogative onto the applying state. By inverse 
conclusion, this could mean that there is no such objective as 
achieving a fair distribution of income between the contracting 
states (see M Schönhaus, “Die Behandlung der stillen 
Gesellschaft im Recht der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des OECD”-Partnership-
Reports (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Peter Lang, 
Frankfurt etc 2005), pp 42-43). Nevertheless, the correct 
application of the instrument seems to be a value in itself.
(E) MODERN APPROACH 
This value or objective is more clearly visible in the German-
Swedish DTC of 1992.
The German Swedish DTC of 1992 opens a new chapter in 
DTC drafting. Not only does it cover a wider range of taxes, 
including inheritance and gift taxes, displays a different title 
compared to the earlier DTCs:
Abkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem 
Königreich Schweden zur Vermeidung der Doppelbesteuerung 
bei den Steuern vom Einkommen und vom Vermögen sowie 
bei den Erbschafts- und Schenkungssteuern und zur Leistung 
gegenseitigen Beistands bei den Steuern (Deutsch-schwedisches 
Steuerabkommen)
[Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Kingdom of Sweden about the avoidance of 
double taxation of taxes on income and assets as well on 
inheritance and gifts and about mutual assistance with 
taxes] (German-Swedish tax agreement - BStBl 1994 I 
S. 422, BGBl. 1994 II S. 686).
– but also includes a novel clause regarding interpretation 
of the convention which is not contained in the OECD Model, 
Article 3(2).
Artikel 3 - Article 3
Allgemeine Begriffsbestimmungen (General definitions)
(2) Dieses Abkommen ist bei seiner Anwendung durch beide 
Vertragsstaaten übereinstimmend aus sich selbst heraus 
auszulegen. Ein in diesem Abkommen nicht definierter Ausdruck 
hat jedoch dann die Bedeutung, die ihm nach dem Recht des 
anwendenden Staates zukommt, wenn der Zusammenhang 
dies erfordert und die zuständigen Behörden sich nicht auf eine 
gemeinsame Auslegung geeinigt haben (Artikel 39 Absatz 3, 
Artikel 40 Absatz 3).
[An interpretation of this convention is to be derived from 
the convention itself when applied by both contracting 
states. A term which is not defined in this convention 
however, has the meaning which it has according to the 
law of the applying state if the context so requires and if 
the competent authorities have not reached an agreement 
on a joint interpretation, Art 39(3) and Art 40(3)].
Finally, the corresponding scenario to the unilateral 
application is part of the equation, and it includes the treaty 
specific interpretation. The necessity to consider the treaty 
context is reinforced by becoming a condition for interpreting 
a term according to domestic law, not an outer limit.
The German Swedish DTC clearly also includes the 
interest of the taxpayer into the objectives and purpose of the 
convention. It describes a right to a “coordinated application 
of the convention”, Article  39(3). It gives “a person” the right 
to refer the matter to the tax authority in his or her country 
of residence or even that of the other country, Article 40(1). 
Artikel 39 - Article 39
Konsultation - Consultation
(3) Die zuständigen Behörden der Vertragsstaaten können 
gemeinsam über allgemeine Regelungen beraten, um auf der 
Grundlage des Abkommens den Anspruch der Steuerpflichtigen 
auf abgestimmte Anwendung des Abkommens in beiden Staaten 
durch gemeinsame Auslegungen oder durch besondere Verfahren 
zu sichern. 
[The ...authorities... can conduct joint consultations in 
order to secure the taxpayer’s right to a co-ordinated 
application of the convention in both states by way of 
joint interpretation or special procedures.]
Artikel 40 - Article 40
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Verständigung - mutual agreement 
(1)Ist eine Person der Auffassung, daß Maßnahmen eines 
Vertragsstaats oder beider Vertragsstaaten für sie zu einer 
Besteuerung führen oder führen werden, die diesem Abkommen 
nicht entspricht, so kann sie unbeschadet der nach dem 
innerstaatlichen Recht dieser Staaten vorgesehenen Rechtsbehelfe 
ihren Fall der zuständigen Behörde des Vertragsstaats, in dem sie 
ansässig ist, oder, sofern ihr Fall von Artikel 38 Absatz 1 erfaßt 
wird, der zuständigen Behörde des Vertragsstaats unterbreiten, 
dessen Staatsangehöriger sie ist. 
[A person is entitled to refer his or her case to the 
authorities of his or her state of residence or nationality 
irrespective of national procedure if they think that 
measures taken by one or both contracting states will lead 
to a taxation that does not comply with this convention.]
(2)Hält die zuständige Behörde die Einwendung für begründet 
und ist sie selbst nicht in der Lage, eine befriedigende Lösung 
herbeizuführen, so wird sie sich bemühen, den Fall durch 
Verständigung mit der zuständigen Behörde des anderen 
Vertragsstaats so zu regeln, daß eine dem Abkommen nicht 
entsprechende Besteuerung vermieden wird. ... 
[If the competent authority considers the complaint 
justified... they can seek an understanding with... the 
other contracting state, in order to resolve the case in 
such a way that a taxation that does not comply with this 
convention is avoided]. 
An evolution has taken place between Article II(3) DTC 
D-UK and Article 3(2) DTC D-S towards the autonomous 
interpretation method. There is a clear preference for mutual 
understanding and interpretation in this article, and the 
unilateral interpretation is made into a last resort. To eliminate 
this unilateral element entirely, however, still seems to be 
politically unattainable. 
Uniformity in its application
The question arises whether value can be derived from this 
DTC for the interpretation of others, so that it would affect the 
treatment of the “silent partner” under the German-British 
DTC. This idea was considered by the judges in Memec.
In the absence of a directly corresponding German 
decision on the same DTC, considerations arose as to what 
extent findings under different DTCs would have an effect on 
the interpretation problem in hand. While Robert Walker J 
pointed to the requirement of a symmetrical interpretation of 
the conventions in different states, Sir Christopher Staughton 
considered that this requirement would be stronger in regard 
to multilateral conventions than bilateral ones. He saw in such 
a multilateral element the possibility of relating different DTCs 
to each other, for example the decision of the BFH in respect 
of the German-Swiss DTC of 1982 which 
has similar wording; and it is very probable that a great many 
others do, since some such wording is to be found in the Model 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital of the OECD... 
(Memec plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners (IRC) [1998] 
STC, 754 ,771 (CA)). 
This argument possibly suggests the development of 
international precedent in the area of cross-border taxation. It 
is questionable, though, to what extent the DTCs themselves 
can influence each other, being separately negotiated 
instruments always reflecting the specific requirements 
between two states. Rather, the VCLT, together with established 
principles of international law, written and customary, provides 
the overarching platform and reference for interpretation 
guidance. 
…and observance of its international character
The wording of Model Article 3(2), which is very similar to 
Article II(3) of the DTC UK-D, seems to be a derogation of 
Article 30 of the VCLT. The VCLT was not in force at the time 
of the conclusion of the DTC, but very much so during the 
numerous updates of the model. The “derogation” seems to 
be based on the fact that only “one of the contracting parties” 
applies the convention. It is an agreement not to agree on 
interpretation and to accept unilateral determination. The 
avoidance, or at least mitigation, of the resulting discrepancy of 
understanding and interpretation and application is the subject 
of Article 31 VCLT. 
It appears that DTCs are very much conventions sui generis 
and considerably lack an element of reciprocity which can 
normally be assumed to be a key element of any treaty.
To mitigate this impression, one reading of Article 3(2) of 
the model could be that both the element of the interpretation 
article and the meaning of the respective term in domestic 
law have to be established in the context of the convention 
according to Article 31-33 VCLT.
Elements of such a reading can be found in the above-
mentioned German decisions and certainly in English case 
law, including Memec and Fothergill. It should be acceptable 
to domestic tax authorities to give a term a meaning for the 
purposes of the DTC. It is conceivable that “silent partner” 
means just that, and that the subtlety of him or her being 
“atypical” is not transportable into English law and convention 
law. The fact that English law does not recognise this notion, 
based on such thorough argument as carried out in Memec, 
and that the UK is going to be deprived of the taxation on 
the proceeds of the silent partnership is a strong argument in 
favour of an interpretation that denies that there is room for 
differentiation given that the “atypical” silent partner is still a 
silent partner. On the other hand, there are certain elements 
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in the wording of ArticleVI(4), last sentence, DTC UK-D that 
may allow the differentiation: 
in a case of the Federal Republic the term includes income arising 
from participation in the capital and profits of a company resident 
in the Federal Republic, and the income derived by a sleeping 
partner from his participation as such.
While one could derive the “atypical” from an inverse 
conclusion from the fact that only the participation in the 
capital and profits is mentioned there, but the final part of 
the sentence, “income derived by a sleeping partner from 
his participation as such” dilutes the force of this argument. 
One cannot help wondering why the “atypical” partner was 
not expressly mentioned in the “business profits’ provision 
of Article III DTC D-UK if it is so close to the heart to 
German scholarship and tax practice (German-British silent 
partnerships are possibly few and far between while the bulk of 
those cases arise from German-Swiss transactions). 
As DTCs are not expressly derogating from general treaty 
law and international law, it must be assumed that they are 
covered by such rules. A degree of uniformity and symmetry 
of application in both contracting states should therefore be a 
legitimate aim of interpretation of DTCs. For this reason, the 
interpretation rules of DTCs formed after the OECD Model 
need to be complemented by general rules of international law 
as well as an accepted method.
Interestingly, as was mentioned above, this method is 
missing from the model. 
Perhaps benefit could be derived here from referring to the 
contract law conventions of the 1980s, CISG and the Ottawa 
conventions. These are a result of a further few decades of 
international legal evolution. The theory of gaps could provide 
the stepping stone to offer a solution to the interpretation 
problem created in Art 3 (2) of the OECD Model. The 
wording “if the term is not defined in the convention” could 
be read as meaning the same as a “matter not expressly settled 
within the instrument”, describing an internal gap. Because of 
the absence of an instruction to refer to “principles underlying 
the convention”, the reference to domestic law could be read 
as using a domestic meaning in the above-described sense, 
qualified by the requirements of the convention, in order to 
interpret the term in its context as Article 3(2) of the model 
requires (it requires a test to rule out that “the context 
otherwise requires”). 
This would be in line with Article 31 VCLT. It would imply 
that a term can have a domestic meaning and a different 
meaning for the purposes of the convention, for example in 
order to remain within a shared understanding of the term, 
as described in Memec, and also in order to give effect to the 
object and purpose of the convention conceived as a free 
standing value. 
The legitimacy of such an approach receives underpinning 
by the more modern DTCs, such as the German-Swedish one, 
providing more emphasis on the self-referring interpretation 
and the rights of the taxpayer to a correct application of the 
DTC, or rather taxation according to the DTC, and not just the 
avoidance of double taxation. In the case of the German-British 
DTC, case law in both countries, unfortunately not directly 
relating to each other, also supports this line of thought, even 
including the idea of preserving the partner state’s right to tax, 
as in the German-US case of 1992 and certainly observing 
Article 32 VCLT.
(F) AN INTERPRETATION STANDARD FOR 
DTCS
Method
Article 3 (2) of the OECD Model Tax Treaty, which is a 
slightly expanded version of Article II(3) of the DTC D-UK, 
can be complemented by an interpretation standard drawing 
on and including the wider context of such international law. 
A method as in the above-mentioned trade law conventions 
will not be achievable, so that the autonomous interpretation 
method in this context is the treaty specific interpretation 
method which is achievable de lege lata. It is not only the 
desirable standard but also the legal requirement under the 
1969 VCLT and other binding international law. It is desirable 
however to include a more elaborate wording reflecting an 
appropriate interpretation technique de lege ferenda.
Interpretation – objects and purposes
Such a review should consider whether the actual 
interpretation of a term in its context is aided by the rules 
of Article 7(1) CISG and those in the other UNIDROIT 
conventions demanding to have regard to the international 
character of the norms and even to promote uniformity in 
the application of a bilateral convention. This rule describes 
the approach of the user of such law. The approach should 
be mindful of the underlying facts of the case that require 
the application of the international instrument. These facts 
are characterised by an international scenario not necessarily 
created by an interaction of two states as in the exchange and 
mutual agreement provisions of the DTCs, but often by the 
activity of an individual crossing borders between those states. 
Within the EU this individual can certainly expect support in 
their legitimate cross-border activities by the legislator and the 
applying authorities and courts. 
The title of the German-British DTC reveals a two-fold 
objective in this respect, though – the prevention of double 
taxation and of tax evasion are two objectives pursued on 
behalf of different players and with different means. The 
former is protecting the taxpayer and enabling cross border 
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commercial activity and migration. The latter is protecting the 
fiscal interests of the contracting states, potentially against the 
same taxpayer. This can lead to strong tensions in the attempt 
to find the most appropriate interpretation for a given term of 
the DTC.
Tax evasion is thought to be so closely related to double 
taxation, or its removal, in daily practice that it appears 
again on the 2012 agenda of the annual ERA (Europaeische 
Rechtsakademie, Academy of European Law) conference on 
direct taxation in Trier:
key topics:...
Removing double taxation (DT): the fight against tax fraud and 
tax evasion
Those two heads should be subject to separate international 
instruments. They serve two different aims, even the proverbial 
two different masters, and cannot be reconciled.
The discussion here is intended to demonstrate how the 
objects and purpose of a uniform international instrument 
influences the outcome of the interpretation exercise of 
its terms. In this case the poorly communicated aims and 
objects of DTCs have a very negative impact on meaningful 
interpretation and yield unsatisfactory results for both the 
contracting state and the taxpayer.
3. THE AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION 
METHOD
The autonomous method of applying and interpreting 
uniform instruments of international law therefore consists of 
two elements – the actual interpretation of its terms and the 
method of its application in the context with other, external 
law. No international instrument can claim to be entirely self-
contained. An international instrument must therefore include 
rules on both aspects. 
There is also a qualitative element of these rules which gives 
effect to the intended objects and purposes of the instrument 
and respects its international character. This is a requirement 
distinguishing international or transnational from domestic 
legislation. The autonomous interpretation method is 
therefore not simply an end in itself, but it has a free-standing 
value derived from the function of the uniform instrument. 
Its purpose is the acknowledgement of the cross-border 
factual situations to be addressed by the instrument. The 1969 
VCLT contains general rules for interpretation applicable to 
all international treaties concluded by its signatories. The 
minimum interpretation standard of Article 31-33 VCLT is 
therefore a legal requirement. It does not contain rules on the 
method to follow if the limits of scope or content are reached 
in any one uniform instrument by way of this interpretation 
method. 
Such rules have been developed for the more modern 
instruments by UNIDROIT. There is no reason why such 
rules should not be used or at least serve as a model also in 
the OECD Model Tax convention or other instruments in the 
area of public law. Again, more modern instruments in this 
area like the 1992 German-Swedish DTC show that progress 
has been made in legal doctrine and that there is a need for 
implementation of such progress in the positive law.
4.  COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW
It is possible to divide the application and interpretation 
rules in CESL into interpretation and method provisions.
(i) Interpretation
CESL offers a novel interpretation standard. As described 
above, this is spread over three different places within the 
entire instrument; the Preamble (Recital 29), the Regulation 
(Art 11) and the Annex I, the actual sales law (Art 4(1)). 
The first novelty is that the role of “underlying principles 
and objectives” is now part of the interpretation standard 
rather than the method of progressing from one regime to 
another upon the encounter of gaps. This technique is expressly 
provided for in Recital 29 of the Preamble and in Art 4(1) of 
the Annex. The latter rules also contain the second novelty, 
the express use of the term autonomous for an interpretation 
technique. The wording of that rule does however suggest that 
using the underlying principles and objectives is not all it takes 
to make for an autonomous interpretation.
1. The Common European Sales Law is to be interpreted 
autonomously and in accordance with its objectives and the 
principles underlying it [emphasis added].
The autonomous interpretation is distinct from referring to 
underlying principles and objectives of an instrument. CESL 
seems to presuppose an understanding of this term. One 
component is added in Recital 29, last sentence:
The rules of the Common European Sales Law should be 
interpreted on the basis of the underlying principles and objectives 
and all its provisions.
This establishes the interpretation standard common to 
civil law jurisdictions, and expressly confirms that CESL is to 
be conceived as a comprehensive set of rules and not a toolbox. 
This is a third novelty.
A fourth novel component of the interpretation standard in 
CESL is the use of the lex specialis rule in Article 4(3):
3. Where there is a general rule and a special rule applying to 
a particular situation within the scope of the general rule, the 
special rule prevails in any case of conflict.
This rule uses generalised language, “where there is.” 
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With regard to cross-border cases to be covered by CESL, the 
question arises whether Article 4 (3) is self-referring or making 
a general statement. Does it exclusively describe the hierarchy 
of norms within CESL or among all rules that may become 
applicable to a given situation? It is not just the position of 
the rule within the proposal that suggests the former is 
the intended understanding, but also the context with the 
preceding paragraph (2) and Recital 29, third sentence, 
indicating the method.
(ii) Method
Recital 29, third sentence and Article 4(2) Annex I CESL 
establish the method for the application of the proposal. These 
rules extend the instruction for the interpretation of CESL, 
turning to underlying principles and objectives, and also to 
dealing with internal gaps. They add that no recourse should 
be taken to “any other law”, expressly ruling out national law 
“that would be applicable in the absence of an agreement to 
use CESL.”
CESL is thereby entirely self-referring. Other than the 
UNIDROIT instruments it does not include recourse to 
a national law via conflict rules in case of internal gaps. It 
wants to force the user to derive answers exclusively from the 
instrument itself.
This presupposes a great confidence in the exhaustive 
coverage of the proposal of its subject matter. It also shields the 
instrument from being overridden by mandatory rules of the 
national laws which in conflict of laws prevail over the chosen 
law.
By not allowing recourse to “any other law”, all uniform 
international instruments are excluded from supplementing 
CESL in case an internal gap is met with. This highlights the 
weakness of the CESL when the fifth novelty is taken into 
account. CESL is deemed to be national law. And yet, its 
object and purpose is to cover cross-border contracts which 
traditionally are the subject of tailor made international 
uniform instruments as well as private international law. 
A paradox is used to smooth over traditional resentment of 
national laws to concede to the needs of cross-border trade 
and allow a more flexible and progressive conflict law. It is an 
attempt to avoid the use of conflict law altogether and place 
it into the area of external gaps, matters outside the scope of 
CESL. 
These CESL specific external gaps are subject only to Union 
law instruments, the Rome I and Rome II Regulations ((EC) 
No 593/2008 and (EC) No 864/2007). The interpretation 
standard for “external gaps” is provided in Recital 27 and 28 
– these are to be addressed by the said regulations, “any other 
relevant conflict of law rule” (Rec 27) and “without prejudice 
to the Union or national law in relation to any such matters’ 
(Rec 28). The choice of CESL also expressly excludes the 
applicability of CISG.
CESL therefore provides not only a self-referring 
instrument but also an exclusively Union- specific set of rules. 
The above-mentioned lex specialis rule in Article 4(3) of the 
Annex I must also appear in this context to be self-referring, 
thereby excluding any potential international norms that may 
be able to supplement CESL at the point of internal or external 
gaps. In the case of CISG and UPICC this also excludes the 
use the databases that have been created and maintained over 
the years. A new database is planned which will contain “final” 
decisions about CESL across EU Member States, according to 
Article 14 of the proposed Regulation.
(iii) Autonomous interpretation
(a) De lege lata
CESL does not deliver a definition of autonomous 
interpretation. An interpretation standard is described but 
technically set apart from the autonomous interpretation 
and thereby presupposed. If this technical use of language 
is disregarded it could be inferred that CESL considers the 
autonomous interpretation method as exclusively self-referring 
and including reference to principles and objectives underlying 
CESL.
No general standard is created by this, but exclusively a 
CESL standard. The aim is to isolate CESL from any other law, 
even separate from the application of Union PIL.
The autonomous interpretation, if it can be pre-supposed, 
will consist of two components established by legal doctrine, 
court practice and international treaty drafting under the 
auspices of international organisations over more than five 
decades. It will also include the rule of the 1969 VCLT. The 
two components are an interpretation standard relating to 
the individual terms of the instrument as well as a method 
to integrate the uniform instrument as a whole into its legal 
context.
Substantive criteria of the interpretation standard are:
•	 the observance of the international character of the 
norm;
•	 the need to promote uniformity in international law;
•	 the ordinary meaning of a term; 
•	 the context of a term within the uniform instrument 
including its object and purpose;
•	 recourse to preparatory materials;
•	 subsequent agreements and practice among the parties 
to an instrument and other joint intentions of the 
parties.
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Substantive criteria of the method are:
•	 the theory of gaps;
•	 reference to underlying principles and objectives upon 
the establishment of internal gaps;
•	 reference to national law via PIL upon the establishment 
of external gaps or upon the establishment of internal 
gaps “in the absence” of underlying principles and 
objectives.
CESL expressly excludes all these criteria from both 
components except for the theory of gaps. CESL adds a 
criterion to the interpretation standard and moves a criterion 
from the method to the interpretation standard, so that the 
interpretation standard includes:
•	 reference to all its rules;
•	 recourse to underlying principles and objectives and 
“established principles of Union law”;
•	 lex specialis rule, CESL only.
•	 CESL does not include any of the criteria on method, 
and includes instead:  
•	 the theory of gaps; 
•	 reference exclusively to CESL rules upon establishment 
of internal gaps;
•	 reference only to Rome I and Rome II upon the 
establishment of external gaps.
The VCLT will not apply to CESL because it is deemed to 
be national law, according to its Explanatory Memorandum, 
section 3, and it is certainly not a treaty but secondary law 
passed by an international (supranational) organisation.
(b) De lege ferenda
Recital 14 of the CESL proposal expressly considers the 
possibility of a choice of this instrument between parties 
from EU MS and from third states. For this reason it is highly 
doubtful that the exclusion of pre-existing international law is 
helpful.
CESL sets out to cover cross-border transactions but also 
purely domestic ones (Rec 14).
It is highly doubtful whether the combination of such 
different objectives will be helpful.
The autonomous interpretation method for international 
uniform legal instruments with both a private and a public 
law subject content would ideally include both components, 
the interpretation standard and the method for application. It 
would include all the above criteria developed by international 
drafting agencies so far and those which have been adopted 
on a political level. It would include the standards set by the 
1969 VCLT:
•	 In addition, a criterion for a comprehensive 
interpretation standard providing that reference is 
to be made to all the rules of an instrument, thereby 
excluding the toolbox approach as well as a premature 
assumption of a gap.
•	 The supplementation of the method by introducing 
recourse to other international uniform instruments 
before the application of national law via conflict 
rules would be another welcome improvement de lege 
ferenda. This technique can be seen as applying the lex 
specialis rule as introduced in CESL but understood in 
a wider context, pointing to tailor-made uniform law 
regardless of its quality as state or non-state made, or 
hard or soft law, and thereby expanding the traditional 
and current standard in choice of law.
The autonomous interpretation method is not an end in 
itself. It denotes an interpretation and application standard 
which seeks to achieve the most appropriate result for a case 
to which the uniform instrument applies, to give effect to 
the rules of the instrument in the interest of an improved 
international legal practice. It is therefore closely related to 
the objects and purposes underlying the instrument, and a 
misalignment of object and purpose with the content of the 
uniform rules affects the quality of the interpretation.
The autonomous interpretation method is not simply 
self-referring but includes a quality of best efforts. It wants 
to achieve an “instrument specific” interpretation. This is 
expressed in the clauses of CISG and the “Ottawa conventions”: 
“regard is to be had to [its] international character and the 
need to promote uniformity in [its] application.” It includes 
the solution achieved in Fothergill (in line with the VCLT) that 
a term can have a different meaning according to its context, 
domestic or international,  as demonstrated above by way of 
the example of the “atypical silent partner” in the DTC D-UK.
This certainly describes a subjective element in the 
application of uniform law but also in its drafting. Only a 
benevolent attitude taken by the user as well as the drafters 
facilitates the functioning of international law. Clarity about 
the objects and purpose of any one uniform instrument is the 
indispensable starting point.
(iv) Objects and purposes
It is my submission that the main reason for failure of an 
interpretation of international law lies within the process of 
establishing the objects and purposes of an instrument, both 
on the part of the drafters and the users.
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As set out briefly above both the private law conventions 
and the DTCs have unexplained elements in their objects and 
purposes. The objects and purposes of an international legal 
instrument are to be found in its title, in its preamble, in the 
preparatory work or implicitly in its rules. It is left to the user 
to discover the objects and purposes. They could however 
be much more extensively set out as part of the operative 
rules of an instrument to avoid speculation about what they 
include or perhaps positively exclude. This would mean that 
the contracting parties would be less prepared to conclude 
agreements half-heartedly or in the hope of achieving aims that 
the other party may not share. 
Looking at treaties through the “contract law lens”, 
obviously a lack of consent leads to a defect in the agreement 
and possibly to its validity (see S Gopalan, “Demandeur-
centricity in transnational commercial law” in M Andenas and 
C Baasch Andersen (eds), Theory and Practice of Harmonisation 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (UK), Northampton 
(MA) 2011), 163 with further references). Leaving such a 
friction and misalignment unaddressed will shift the problem 
arising from this to the end user, either the lawyers and judges 
or the actual addressees of the instrument, traders or migrating 
taxpayers.
It may be common to encounter undisclosed aims as part 
of diplomatic efforts to pass an instrument at an international 
level. It is deemed to be an unavoidable element of negotiations. 
This is not necessarily a lack of consent. It can be a consent 
to be silent about unpopular aims, or to slip content into 
the instrument serving a disputed aim. The problem is a 
misalignment between objective and content. This will be less 
frequent in a domestic setting due to the undisputed position 
of the legislative body within its political entity. Legitimacy of 
legislation is the result of a long process of diplomatic work. The 
UN, WTO, OECD and UNIDROIT are the result of such long 
term international co-operation. The objects and purposes are 
debated at the start of each of the drafting and negotiation 
procedures. A shift may occur during the negotiations but a 
shift cannot be assumed by subsequent users of the instrument 
once it is adopted. The objects and purposes cannot follow the 
evolution of the law through time, and would need express 
adaptation. 
The trade law conventions are made by states but addressed 
to private parties. The objective clearly is the facilitation of 
international trade. But sometimes individual questions are not 
brought to agreement and therefore gaps or reservation clauses 
result. Gaps are therefore more common in international 
instruments than domestic sales law.
In the double tax conventions, the objects and purposes 
are difficult to pin down. The title is the main lead. The titles 
vary among the many bilateral conventions, showing how 
the emphasis shifts depending on the relations between the 
contracting states, their tax laws and the fashions of the time in 
which they were concluded. What is clearly visible is that where 
multiple aims are pursued by an instrument, interpretation 
problems increase. The reason is that those multiple aims 
may not be compatible with each other, may compromise one 
another, and therefore would better be pursued in separate 
instruments.
CESL may be such a case, too. There are many opinions 
among scholars and consultees stating that CESL should 
concentrate on consumer contracts, those between traders and 
consumers (b2c) and those between consumers and consumers 
(c2c).
There may be different needs between those groups that 
cannot be addressed in one instrument. CESL is, allegedly, 
going by the Explanatory Memorandum and the preamble, 
based on empirical data showing the needs of the trading 
community across Europe. The objects and purposes can 
therefore be tailored according to the needs to be addressed 
and the factual situations to be resolved.
Frictions between objectives and interpretation standards 
can therefore occur in two cases: if the needs are not there 
or if the solutions offered by CESL do not match the factual 
situations to be addressed. Both problems can occur in CESL. 
First of all, as much as the empirical research may satisfy the 
requirements of European legislation, it still leaves doubts 
(see M Heidemann, “European Private Law at the Crossroads: 
the proposed new European Sales Law”, 20 European Review 
of Private Law (2012) 1119, 1123). The inverse conclusion 
from the research summarised and published by DG Justice 
in their press release shows that the majority of traders do 
not see an obstacle to their trade in the existence of different 
contract laws, so that they do not feel they need a Common 
European Sales Law (Justice Newsroom: “Common European 
Sales Law to boost trade and expand consumer choice” http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/news/20111011_en.htm 
[9 April 2012], 6). But certainly the CESL wants to address 
problems arising from cross border sales. Declaring CESL to 
be national law therefore clashes with this aim. The purpose 
behind the qualification of CESL as national law is to avoid 
problems arising from the international law status of a uniform 
instrument and its relationship with PIL. Does this not 
mean denying the legitimacy of the underlying international 
transactions? Does the aim of de-internationalisation of 
the legal instrument outweigh the effort to help traders and 
consumers with cross border sales and purchases? Is the 
emphasis on sales or purchases?
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The purpose of a uniform legal instrument cannot be 
detached from the transaction it is purporting to regulate. If 
this transaction or other factual situation is international in 
the sense of crossing borders, then the instrument must be 
part of international law. The interpretation of the instrument 
must also consider the nature of the underlying facts, therefore 
its international character. If the cross-border transaction or 
activity itself is unwanted, no stipulation should be made. The 
underlying cross-border transaction or situation must be fully 
recognised as legitimate in the first instance. If the underlying 
attitude of the rule-maker is one of resistance against the 
actual facts of the case, which may be the case with migration 
and ensuing double taxation issues, it is no surprise that the 
resulting legal instrument reflects this resistance within its 
rules and makes interpretation very difficult. 
The difference in wording should be noted at this point 
between the trade law conventions and the VCLT on the one 
hand and CESL on the other: the former use the term “object” 
which refers to the subject matter of the instrument while 
CESL uses the term “objectives” which denotes the aims and 
purposes. The object however must reflect decisively onto the 
instrument itself if it is to be successful.
If CESL partly aims to suppress the cross-border element 
in cross border sales (the object) and purchases because it is 
irritating to domestic scholarship, then the resulting rules will 
reflect this and will not give rise to an evolution of international 
legal doctrine and suitable interpretation methods for 
international law. 
CESL has the potential of contributing to such evolution 
because an EU regulation could advance the use of the 
autonomous interpretation method and ban the unhelpful 
obstacles upheld by legal doctrine against the use of tailor made 
transnational law which can successfully govern cross border 
transactions under the lex specialis rule. The true objectives and 
purposes of CESL need to be revisited and streamlined both 
regarding the actual content and the matters in hand, or vice 
versa.
5. CONCLUSION
The new CESL proposal offers three valuable additions to 
existing interpretation and application rules in international 
uniform law. It expressly includes for the first time the so-
called autonomous interpretation method, it provides for 
a comprehensive application method of all the rules of the 
legal instrument, and it introduces the lex specialis rule into 
the interpretation standard. The nature of the instrument 
as a directly applicable and binding EU regulation, albeit 
optional, is a great benefit to the evolution and progress of 
international legal doctrine. Disappointingly, CESL stops short 
of explicitly purporting to the furthering of international law 
but is drafted to form part of domestic law. Together with the 
strictly self-referring approach it might effectively isolate itself 
from existing uniform law and therefore from the doctrines of 
international law. 
Comparing CESL with pre-existing international uniform 
law instruments, both treaties and model laws, shows that 
there may be a lack of a common basis for the two regimes, the 
EU-wide and the global. The uniform law addressed to a global 
trading community, or a migrating community of European 
and worldwide citizens such as trade law conventions and 
double taxation treaties, shows an evolving standard for the 
interpretation and application of their norms. This standard 
is formed by the 1969 VCLT as well as the method developed 
in these instruments under the auspices of international 
organisations such as the UN, the OECD, the Hague 
Conference and UNIDROIT. 
The so-called autonomous interpretation method consists 
of a comprehensive approach combining an interpretation 
standard and a method to provide solutions when gaps are 
encountered in the uniform instrument. The autonomous 
interpretation method is more than just a self-referring 
interpretation of its terms. It requires awareness of the 
objectives and purposes of the instrument as well as the 
willingness to give effect to the international character not only 
of the norm itself as required by the interpretation rules but 
to that of the underlying facts of the case. An important role is 
played by objects and purposes of the international instrument. 
If these do not correspond well to the content and indeed the 
requirements of the addressees of an instrument, a successful 
interpretation process cannot be expected. 
•	 This article is based on a lecture given at the IALS in 
October 2012.
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